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The Death with Dignity Movement:

Protecting Rights and Expanding Options
After Glucksberg and Quill
Kathryn L.Tucker*
INTRODUCTION
Increasingly, and largely as a result of modern medicine,
dying patients want more control over the timing and manner of
their deaths and want to have the option of a humane, physician-assisted death if their pain and suffering become intolerable.' Poll data consistently reflect that a substantial majority of
citizens believe that competent, terminally ill patients should
have the option of receiving medication that patients could selfadminister to bring about a humane and peaceful death if pain
and suffering become intolerable.2 Opinion polls also reveal that
a majority of physicians believe such patients should have this
option.3 However, most states have statutes prohibiting assisting
* Ms. Tucker is Director of Legal Affairs at Compassion in Dying. She
is Counsel at Perkins Coie and Affiliate Professor of Law at the University of
Washington School of Law. Ms. Tucker was lead counsel in both of the federal
constitutional challenges asserting that competent, terminally ill patients
have a constitutional right to choose physician assistance in dying. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996) (en bane), rev'd
sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997); Quill v. Vacco, 80
F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997). Ms. Tucker is grateful
for the able assistance of attorney Nancy Grennan, associate at Perkins Coie,
in the preparation of this article. Comments may be directed to Ms. Tucker
via email at tuckk@perkinscoie.com
1. An excellent overview of the developments in modern medicine that
have caused this to occur is found in the first three chapters of MARILYN
WEBB, THE GOOD DEATH: THE NEW AMERICAN SEARCH TO RESHAPE THE END
OF LIFE (1997).
2. See, e.g., Kate Stewart, PhysicianAid in Dying, POLLING REP., July
28, 1997, at 1, 6-7 (providing polling data broken down by gender, race, age,
socioeconomic status, religious affiliation, and political affiliation, and concluding: "That the American public strongly supports allowing a doctor to assist a terminally ill, suffering patient end his or her life.... [Slupport is in
the 69% to 75%range.").
3. See Jerald G. Bachman et al., Attitudes of Michigan Physicians and
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suicide.' Although it is unclear that such laws were intended to
reach the act of a physician in prescribing medication that a dying
patient could take to bring on a humane death, it is clear that
the laws deter many physicians from doing so.' Despite that, a
widespread underground practice of physician-assisted dying
exists." Thus, in the debate now raging regarding physicianassisted dying, the question is not really whether the practice
should occur, but whether the practice should proceed underground
and unregulated, or openly and regulated to protect patients, regularize access, and accommodate legitimate state interests.
In an effort to establish that competent dying patients have
the right to choose openly a humane, physician-assisted death,
the assisted suicide laws of New York and Washington were
challenged on federal constitutional grounds in the cases of
the Public Toward Legalizing Physician-Assisted Suicide and Voluntary
Euthanasia,334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 303, 306 (1996); Jonathan S. Cohen et aL,
Attitudes Toward Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia Among Physicians in
Washington State, 331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 89, 90-91 (1994); Melinda A. Lee et
al., LegalizingAssisted Suicide-Views of Physicians in Oregon, 334 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 310, 311 (1996). The American College of Legal Medicine, the American Medical Students Association, together with a coalition of nationally
prominent medical clinicians and academics (as well as bioethicists, hospice
professionals, and psychological associations), filed amicus briefs supporting
legalizing this option in the Glucksberg and Quill cases. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of the American College of Legal Medicine, Glucksberg (No. 96110); Brief Amici Curiae of the American Medical Student Association and a
Coalition of Distinguished Medical Professionals in Support of Respondents,
Glucksberg (No. 96-110). The American Medical Association, as well as other
medical professional associations, are at this time opposed to physicianassisted suicide and filed a brief supporting state bans on assisted suicide.
See Brief of the American Medical Association et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Glucksberg (No. 96-110).
4. See Kathryn L. Tucker & David J. Burman, PhysicianAid in Dying: A
Humane Option, A ConstitutionallyProtected Choice, 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
495, 496 & n. (1995).
5. In the Glucksberg and Quill cases, discussed infra Part I, the physician plaintiffs each attested to the deterrent effect of the state assisted suicide
laws. See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2261; Quill, 117 S. Ct. at 2295.
6. See, e.g., Anthony L. Back et al., Physician-Assisted Suicide and
Euthanasia in Washington State, 275 JAMA 919, 922 (1996) (asserting that
24% of Washington patients explicitly requesting medications that they could
use to hasten death did in fact receive a prescription for the medication from
their physician); Steve Heilig et al., Physician-Hastened Death, Advisory
Guidelinesfor the San FranciscoBay Area from the Bay Area Network of Ethics Committees, 166 W. J. MED. 370, 371 (1997) (stating that the practice of
physicians aiding terminally ill patients' deaths has "long occurred underground, without standards or scrutiny by the medical community"); Richard
A. Knox, 1 in 5 Doctors Say They Assisted a Patient's Death, Survey Finds,
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 28, 1992, at 5.
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Vacco v. Quill' and Washington v. Glucksberg.' The United
States Supreme Court decided both cases in its 1996 Term.
These cases, and the legal issues both addressed and ignored by
the Court, are discussed in Part I. Part 11 explores state legislative avenues that remain viable after Glucksberg and Quill to
provide the option of a legal, humane, and dignified physicianassisted death to competent dying patients. Part I discusses
the state court challenges available to safeguard these patients'
liberty under applicable state constitutional provisions.
In addition to mounting federal and state constitutional
challenges to state laws prohibiting assisted suicide, patient
rights advocates also are working to prompt improved pain care
at the end of life and are exploring litigation to establish that
there is a constitutional right to receive adequate pain medication. This is explored in Part IV. Part V examines application of
medical disciplinary and medical malpractice actions to physician failure to adequately treat the pain of dying patients.
I. THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM TO
PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED DYING
A. BACKGROUND
Patients, doctors and the public interest group Compassion
in Dying challenged the assisted suicide laws in New York and
Washington to the extent that they prohibited doctors from providing medications to competent dying patients that the patients
could use to hasten death if they so chose. Liberty and equality
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution formed the basis of the claims? Two federal courts of appeals, including the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc, agreed that
statutes preventing patients from exercising this option were
unconstitutional."0 These cases were then reviewed by the
United States Supreme Court in its 1996 Term. The Court reversed these decisions, but, as discussed below, left the door

7. 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
8. 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
9. For a fll discussion of the nature and scope of the claims, see generally Tucker & Burman, supra note 4. These cases have been the subject of

extensive commentary.
10. See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2293
(1997); Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996) (en
banc), rev'd sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
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open to both future successful federal constitutional claims and
to legislative reform.

B. WHERE Do WE STAND FOLLOWING GLUCKSBERGAND QuILL?
The Court rendered unanimous decisions upholding the
laws challenged in Glucksberg and Quill. Five Justices, a majority of the Court, wrote or joined concurring opinions that limited
the scope of the majority's ruling and carefully reserved issues
for future cases. These five concurring justices have left the
question of federal constitutional protection of the choice at issue
very much open to future developments.
The majority decision, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
did not actually resolve the narrow question posed by those
challenging the states' laws. Instead, the Court answered a
more general and easily resolved question, one on which the
parties were not in dispute: "[W]hether the 'liberty' specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes a right to commit
suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in doing so.""
The Court recognized that the more difficult question, whether a
dying, suffering patient has a protected right to choose physician
assistance in dying, was not foreclosed by its ruling on the more
general question. 2
Justice O'Connor, in casting the deciding vote, revealed in
her concurrence that she joined the majority only on the understanding that the question decided by the majority was the
"easy" question, writing:
The Court frames the issue in this case as whether the Due Process
Clause of the Constitution protects a 'right to commit suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in doing so'.... I join the Court's
opinions 13because I agree that there is no generalized right to 'commit
suicide.'

Justice O'Connor went on to state explicitly that on the
"difficult" question, she has reserved judgment and remains
open to deciding that issue favorably in a future case:
[RIespondents urge us to address the narrower question whether a
mentally competent person who is experiencing great suffering has a
constitutionally cognizable interest in controlling the circumstances of
his or her imminent death. I see no need to reach that question in the

11. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2269.
12. See id. at 2275 n.24 (stating that the court's "opinion does not absolutely foreclose such a claim).
13. Id. at 2303 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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context of the facial challenges to the New York and Washington laws
at issue here.'4

Justice O'Connor as well as Justice Breyer, in a separate
concurrence, explicitly expressed the view that a viable constitutional claim remained for a future case, specifically involving
patients who could not obtain relief with palliative care. 5 Interestingly, Justices O'Connor and Breyer stated the view that
provision of pain-relieving medication to a patient which hastened death would not violate state laws prohibiting assisted
suicide. For example, Justice O'Connor stated that "a patient
who is suffering from a terminal illness and who is experiencing
great pain has no legal barriers to obtaining medication, from
qualified physicians, to alleviate that suffering, even to the point
of causing unconsciousness and hastening death." 6 She further
wrote, "Tere is no dispute that dying patients... can obtain
palliative care, even when doing so would hasten their deaths 17
14. Id.
15. See id. at 2303, 2312. Justice Ginsberg joined Justice O'Connor's concurrence. See id. The available data indicate that while most patients will be
able to get relief with palliative care, some patients have intractable pain that
cannot be relieved short of sedation to an unconscious state. See, e.g., Ada
Jacox et al., New Clinical-PracticeGuidelinesfor the Management of Pain in
Patientswith Cancer, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 651 (1994) (finding that pain in
up to 90% of cancer patients can be controlled). See generally the fourth
chapter of WEBB, supra note 1. The subset of patients whose pain cannot be
controlled with medication appear to have a claim that the five concurring
justices in Quill and Glucksberg would find within the scope of liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
16. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2303 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
17. Id; see also id. at 2311-12 (Breyer, J., concurring). The practice of
sedating patients with intractable pain into unconsciousness and withholding
food and water until death inevitably ensues is known as terminal sedation
and was endorsed as an acceptable option, indeed one seen as negating the
need for assisted suicide, by the AMA and other amici in the Quill and
Glucksberg cases. For some patients this may be an acceptable option; others
(and their families) abhor the option of accepting an induced coma and a lingering demise while family members stand vigil for the week or ten days it
takes for dehydration and starvation to bring about death. Moreover, it is not
certain that a patient sedated in this manner is free of pain. The medical literature documents that patients under general anesthesia for surgery, a
much deeper form of sedation, may well experience pain. See N. Moerman et
al., Awareness and Recall DuringGeneral Anesthesia: Facts and Feelings, 79
ANESTHESIOLOGY 454, 492, 497 (1993); see also J.M. Evans, Patients' Experiences of Awareness During General Anaesthesia, in CONSCIOUSNESS,
AWARENESS AND PAIN IN GENERAL ANAESTHEsIA 184 (M. Rosen & J.N. Lunn
eds., 1987); J.E. Utting, Awareness: Clinical Aspects in CONSCIOUSNESS,
AWARENESS AND PAIN IN GENERAL ANAESTHESIA, supra, at 171, 172-73; R.C.
Cork et al., Is There Implicit Memory After Propofol Sedation?, 76 BRIT. J.
ANAESTHESIA 492 (1996) (discussing relationship between recall of pain dur-
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Justice Breyer concurred in the judgments upholding the
states' challenged laws, but disagreed with the majority's
"formulation of [the] claimed 'liberty' interest."8 Justice Breyer
expressed the view that on the narrower, more difficult question,
there was "greater support" in "our legal tradition" for a "right to
die with dignity." 9 He explicitly reserved judgment on that
question, writing:
I do not believe, however, that this Court need or now should decide
whether or a [sic] not such a right is Tundamental' That is because, in
my view, the avoidance of severe physical pain (connected with death)
would have to comprise an essential part of any successful claim and
because, as Justice O'Connor points out, the laws before us do not force
a dying person to undergo that kind of pain.'

Unfortunately, and contrary to the assumption of these
Justices, legal barriers to obtaining medication sufficient to adequately relieve pain do exist. Indeed, it is widely recognized that
physicians fail to prescribe adequate medication for relief of
pain, and legal constraints contribute to that situation.'
Thus, Justices O'Connor and Breyer appear to have answered a question that the parties had not actually posed, and
ing anesthesia and after effects). Thus, it is possible that patients subjected
to terminal sedation only appearto be free of pain, perhaps easing the burden
on observers, but not necessarily the patient.
18. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2311 (Breyer, J., concurring).
19. Id.
20. Id.

2L See Jacox et al., supra note 15, at 651 (stating that the pain associated with cancer is frequently undertreated); see also The SUPPORT Principal Investigators, A Controlled Trial to Improve Care for Seriously Ill Hospitalized Patients: The Study to Understand Prognoses and Preferences for
Outcomes and Risks of Treatments (SUPPORT),274 JAMA 1591 (1995).
22. See Robyn S. Shapiro, Health Care Providers'Liability Exposure for
Inappropriate Pain Management, 24 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 360, 363 (1996)
(identifying "fear of legal penalties, especially disciplinary action,... as one of
the most important reasons" health professionals undertreat pain). Shapiro
cites a California survey revealing that "69% of physicians ... stated that the

potential for disciplinary action had made them more conservative in their
use of opioids in pain management." Id.; see also David E. Joranson, State
Medical Board Guidelines for Treatment of Intractable Pain, AM. PAN SOC'Y
BULL., May/June 1995, at 1, 2 (citing California study reflecting that physicians avoid prescribing controlled substances, including "triplicate" drugs,
for patients with intractable pain for fear of discipline by the medical board);
COMMITTEE ON CARE AT THE END OF LIFE, INSTiTuTE OF MEDICINE, APPROACHING DEATH: IMPROVING CARE AT THE END OF LIFE 191, 197 (Marilyn J.
Field & Christine K Cassel eds., 1997) [hereinafter INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE
REPORT] (stating that laws designed to prevent diversion of drugs such as
triplicate prescriptions and limits on the number of medication dosages prescribed are burdensome and deter legitimate prescribing of opioids to patients
at the end of life).
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have recognized that there is a constitutional right to adequate
pain medication.u Efforts to establish this right more firmly can
be anticipated 4
Justice Stevens, also concurring in the judgments, wrote
"separately to make it clear that there is also room for further
debate about the limits that the Constitution places on the
power of the States to punish the practice" of physician-assisted
suicide.' Because the Court addressed only the "easy" question,
Justice Stevens emphasized that its holding "does not foreclose
the possibility that some applications of the statute might well
be invalid." Similarly, Justice Souter's concurrence reflected
his reservation of the decision on the narrower, more difficult
question: "I do not decide for all time that respondents' claim
should not be recognized.... 27
The opinions, both majority and concurring, invited legislative reform. As the majority recognized, "Throughout the Nation,
Americans are engaged in an earnest and profound debate about
the morality, legality, and practicality of physician-assisted suicide. Our holding permits this debate to continue, as it should in
a democratic society."'
Justice Souter's concurring opinion made explicit his preference for legislative action in this area. "The Court should accordingly stay its hand to allow reasonable legislative consideration," and, "the legislative process is to be preferred."29
Similarly, Justice O'Connor's concurrence demonstrated her concern that state legislatures be given the first opportunity to address the issue: "States are presently undertaking extensive and
serious evaluation of physician-assisted suicide and other related issues. In such circumstances, 'the... challenging task of
crafting appropriate procedures for safeguarding... liberty interests is entrusted to the "laboratory" of the States."30
23. Other commentators have observed the recognition of the constitutional right to adequate pain medication. See, e.g., Robert A. Burt, The Supreme CourtSpeaks:Not Assisted Suicide but a ConstitutionalRight to Palliative Care, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1234, 1236 (1997).
24. See discussion infra Part IV.
25. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2304 (Stevens, J., concurring).
26. Id. at 2304. Stevens further stated, "a decision upholding a general
statutory prohibition of assisted suicide does not mean that every possible
application of the statute would be valid." Id. at 2305.
27. Id. at 2293 (Souter, J., concurring).
28. Id. at 2275.
29. Id. at 2293 (Souter, J., concurring).
30. Id. at 2303 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Cruzan v. Director, Mo.
Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 292 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
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Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court has given legislative reform
via state political processes the green light." To date, as discussed below, few state legislatures have attempted to address
this issue, although commentators have proposed excellent
models legislators could use to begin their debate.
1. LEGISLATIVE REFORM AS THE MEANS
TO EXPANDING PATIENT CHOICE
To date only one state, Oregon, has passed a law permitting
physician-assisted suicide." Implementation of that law, entitled the "Oregon Death with Dignity Act," passed in 1994
through the initiative process, has been obstructed by challenges
brought by right-to-life activists.33 In a lawsuit that turned upside down the equal protection argument advanced in the
Glucksberg and Quill cases, the challengers argued that a law
permitting terminally ill patients to choose physician assistance
in dying denied the terminally ill equal protection of the laws.'
The case suffered from fatal threshold infirmities, however, and
the Ninth Circuit dismissed the case on the grounds that the
plaintiffs lacked standing."
Recognizing that the effort to defeat the Oregon legislation
in court was doomed, right-to-life activists refocused their efforts
on defeating the measure politically. They succeeded in forcing a
repeal measure on the ballot for a vote in November 1997.36 That
effort failed in the November election when sixty percent of Ore-

31. At least one Justice explicitly has indicated that he would be inclined
to intervene with judicial relief if "legislative foot-dragging" occurs. See
Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2293 (Souter, J., concurring).
32. See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800-127.897 (1996). Washington and California placed aid-in-dying measures before voters in 1991 and 1992, respectively. Voters in each state rejected both measures by the narrow margin of
four percent. See Davan Maharaj, Most Would Let Terminally Ill Die, LOS
ANGELES TIMES, March 9, 1993, at 10 (stating that the California doctorassisted suicide measure lost by a margin of 54% to 46%); Supporters of
EuthanasiaRefuse to Give Up, DETROIT NEWS, November 7, 1991, at 4A
(noting that 54% of Washington voters voted "no" on the state's physicianassisted suicide initiative).
33. See Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429, 1434-36 (D. Ore. 1995) (holding
that the Oregon Death with Dignity Act eliminates suicide prevention protection for terminally ill persons and thus violates the Equal Protection Clause),
vacated and remanded, 107 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Lee v.
Harcleroad, 118 S. Ct. 328 (1997).
34. See Lee, 107 F.3d at 1386.
35. See id. at 1390.
36. See 6 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 934 (June 12, 1997).
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gon voters rejected the repeal.?7 Following these judicial and political losses, opponents of the Oregon Death with Dignity law
sought relief from the federal government, urging the Drug Enforcement Agency to take action against Oregon physicians who
act in compliance with the law, on the basis that such activity
would violate the Controlled Substances Act?8 Whether this
tactic will continue to impede implementation is yet unclear.
Twenty other states have initiative mechanisms, 9 and certainly other states may follow Oregon in enacting reform legislation through the initiative process. The shortcomings of the
initiative process, however, are well recognized, and it is particularly ill-suited for addressing complex issues such as those related to end-of-life decisionmaldng.
In this complex area, a legislative process that allows for extensive factfinding and continual refinement of proposed provisions throughout the process of development of the legislation
would be preferable to the passage of a law by the inflexible procedure necessary with initiative measures. In the legislative
process, the concerns raised by the states and interest groups in
the federal constitutional litigation could be addressed.4
37. See David J. Garrow, The Oregon Trail,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1997, at
A31; Kim Murphy, Voters in Oregon Soundly Endorse Assisted Suicide, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 5, 1997, at 1.
38. See generally Timothy Egan, Threat from Washington Has Chilling
Effect on OregonLaw Allowing Assisted Suicide, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 19, 1997, at
A18 (noting that the Administrator of the DEA warned that any physician
"who writes a prescription for suicide would be violating the Controlled Substance Act because it is not a legitimate medical purpose for the drugs").
39. See Julian N. Eule, JudicialReview of DirectDemocracy, 99 YALE L.J.
1503, 1509 n.22 (1990) (identifying Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota,
Utah, Washington, and Wyoming as the states that permit citizens to initiate
and enact legislation).
40. See, e.g., Judith F. Daar, Direct Democracy and Bioethical Choices:
Voting Life and Death at the Ballot Box, 28 U. MCH. J.L. REFORM 799, 835
(1995) (summarizing criticisms of the initiative process); David B. Magleby,
Let the Voters Decide? An Assessment of the Initiative and Referendum Process, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 13, 18 (1995).

41. Legislative consideration of regulating the practice of physician provision of medication that could be used to bring about a humane death should
also bring renewed attention to other forms of medical conduct that bring
about death, such as removal of life support and terminal sedation. The physician's effort to bring about a hastened death, whether by provision of prescription medications that patients could take to hasten death, by removal of
life-support, or by provision of terminal sedation, is a profound act and often
raises legitimate state concerns that should be addressed. Unfortunately, in
the context of withdrawal of life-support there are often insufficient protec-
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Numerous models have been proposed and provide a useful
starting point for development of appropriate legislation. These
models generally include measures to ensure accurate diagnosis
of terminal status; to ensure mental competency and to rule out
depression of a nature that would impede rational decisionmaldng,
to ensure that the decision is voluntary, rational, deliberative,
and enduring; and to ensure that patients have been informed of
and offered alternatives such as hospice care.42
Legislative reform could provide relief even to the broad
universe of patients addressed by the Supreme Court's "easy"
question, those who are not terminal but wish to commit suicide,43 but this seems politically unlikely.' Although public
opinion strongly favors permitting competent dying patients the
right to control the timing and manner of death by having access
to prescription medications that could be used to bring about a
humane and dignified death,45 and the U.S. Supreme Court has
encouraged resolution of the issue in state legislative procedures, the powerful opposition of the right-to-life lobby, the
tions, and even those that ostensibly exist are ignored. See, e.g., Kathryn L.
Tucker, Surrogate End of Life Decisionmaking:The Importance of Providing
ProceduralDue Process,A Case Review, 72 WASH. L. REV. 859 (1997).
42. See Brief of Respondents at 41 & n.29, Glucksberg (No. 96-110) (citing
Brief Amici Curiae of State Legislators in Support of Respondents); see also
Heilig et al., supra note 6 (presenting guidelines to follow when patients ask
for assisted suicide); Franklin G. Miller et al., Regulating Physician-Assisted
Death, 331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 119, 122 (1994) (recommending, among other
things, that "physician-assisted death be legalized with adequate safeguards
to protect vulnerable patients"). These sorts of protections could and probably
should be applied to decisions to withdraw life-support and to provide terminal sedation, as the very same concerns about confirming prognosis, ensuring
competency and voluntariness, and the requestfs enduring nature are present.
Other commentators have also recognized the need to do so. See e.g., WEBB,
supra note 1, at 404-05. Such protections, however, do not in fact exist in
these other contexts. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE §§ 70.122-70.122.920 (1996).
Under the Natural Death Act in Washington, a patient may direct withdrawal
of life support when terminally ill, yet the diagnosis need not be confirmed by
a second opinion. Further, there is no requirement that a physician or mental
health provider evaluate the patients mental competency or rule out depression as a motivating factor. Likewise, there is no waiting period or any requirement that the patient be informed of hospice or other alternatives.
43. See, e.g., Charles H. Baron et al., A Model State Act to Authorize and
Regulate Physician-Assisted Suicide, 33 HARv. J. ON LEGIS.

1 (1996)

(proposing legislative reform measures that would permit the option of a
physician-assisted death to nonterminal patients).
44. See Stewart, supra note 2, at 1, 6 (documenting that poll data reflect
that citizen support for physician-assisted dying is limited to the terminally
ill).
45. See Stewart, supra note 2, at 6-7.
46. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
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Catholic Church, and medical societies may continue to make
legislative reform difficult. Thus, a return to the courts for relief
may be necessary.47 As discussed above, the U.S. Supreme Court
may find a federal constitutional right in a future case.48 In addition, patient-rights advocates have the option of seeking relief
from state high courts under provisions of state constitutions, as
will be discussed in Part III.
I. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION
Many states have constitutions that are either more textually explicit regarding protection of individual liberties than is
the Federal Constitution, or have similar text that has been construed by the state's high court as more protective of individual
liberties.49 Thus, for example, state courts have found that restrictions on the use of Medicaid funds for abortions offend state
constitutions," notwithstanding that the U.S. Supreme Court
has held that there is no federal constitutional right to such
funding.1 Similarly, various state courts have held that consensual homosexual activity is protected under provisions of their
own state constitutions, despite the U.S. Supreme Court's
holding that there is no federal constitutional protection of such
activity.5

State courts have often spoken in resounding terms of the
greater protection of individual liberties afforded by state consti47. See supra note 31.
48. See supra notes 15-27 and accompanying text.
49. See generally William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the
Protectionof Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. RsV. 489, 498-502 (1977) (noting
various state supreme court decisions that interpret state constitutional provisions more expansively than provisions in the Federal Constitution); Robert F. Williams, State ConstitutionalLaw: Teaching and Scholarship, 41 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 243 (1991) (describing developments in state constitutional law
and calling for increased teaching and study of state constitutional law).
50. See Linda M. Vanzi, Freedom at Home: State Constitutionsand Medicaid FundingforAbortions,26 N.M. L. RzV. 433,441-53 (1996).
51. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause did not require a state participating in the Medicaid program
to pay abortion expenses for indigent women, even though it chose to pay
childbirth expenses); see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (holding
that the Hyde Amendmenfs limitations on the use of federal funds to reimburse abortion expenses under Medicaid program did not violate the Fifth
Amendments due process guarantee).
52. See, e.g., Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112 (Mont. 1997) (privacy clause);
Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992) (privacy and equal protection clauses).
53. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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tutions. For example, the California Supreme Court recently
noted that "the scope and application of the state constitutional
right of privacy is broader and more protective of privacy than
the federal constitutional right of privacy as interpreted by the
federal courts."' It is now well recognized that state courts can
and will actively turn to their state constitutions to reach results
beyond those mandated by the Federal Constitution."
State court challenges to assisted-suicide prohibitions based
on state constitutional provisions protecting individual privacy,
liberty, or dignity may offer a route to reform in such states.' It
is beneficial that the U.S. Supreme Court did not definitively
reject recognition of such a right under the Federal Constitution
in Glucksberg or Quill,57 as it is generally more difficult to persuade a state high court to reach a conclusion squarely at odds
with the U.S. Supreme Court's construction of a similar provision in the Federal Constitution.9
Recognition by a state high court that the state's constitution protects the choice of a competent dying patient to obtain
medications for the purpose of achieving a humane and dignified
death would be of obvious national significance. Such a decision
would encourage and enable researchers to collect data on how a
legalized practice of physician-assisted death actually operates. 9
54. American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797, 808 (Cal.
1997) (holding that the California Constitution's privacy clause renders unconstitutional statute requiring parental consent to minor's abortion).
55. See Robert F. Williams, In the Glare of the Supreme Court: Continuing
Methodology and Legitimacy Problems in Independent State Constitutional
Rights Adjudication, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1015, 1017 (1997).
56. Only one such challenge has been decided by a state high court. In that
case, the Florida Supreme Court declined to find that the Florida Constitution
protected this choice. See Krischer v. McIver, 697 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1997). It is interesting to compare this restrictive interpretation of the Florida Constitution
with the much more expansive interpretation by the Montana Supreme Court of
that state's similar constitutional provision in a decision addressing state constitutional protection of consensual homosexual activity. See Gryczan v. State, 942
P.2d 112 (Mont. 1997). In the Montana case, the high court had to reject the
U.S. Supreme Court's analysis when it considered the same issue in Bowers v.
Hardwick. See id. at 121. By contrast, the Florida Supreme Court did not have
to overcome the obstacle of a federal constitutional decision to find that the state
constitution protected the claimed conduct, since the U.S. Supreme Court had
not definitively rejected the claim of constitutional protection for physicianassisted suicide. See Krischer,697 So. 2d at 100.
57. See supra notes 11-27 and accompanying text.
58. Scholars have criticized state high court reluctance to analyze analogous state constitutional provisions independently from the U.S. Supreme
Court. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 55.
59. Such information will shortly be available from Oregon in any event.
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This data would help inform the debate regarding legislative reform in other states and in future cases before state or federal
courts. Patient-rights advocates expect that this data will refute
the speculations of antichoice activists and erode the roadblocks
to reform created by unfounded fears in the voting public.'
IV. A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO ADEQUATE PAIN
MEDICATION FOR DYING PATIENTS
Hastened death is not the only or the best choice for many
dying patients facing severe pain and suffering, and thus advocates of death with dignity also seek to galvanize improvements
in the care of the dying and specifically in improving care for
pain.61 The failure of physicians to relieve the pain of dying patients has been extensively documented.' An interesting avenue
to prompt improved care of pain is the development of challenges
to laws that serve to impede or obstruct physicians from prescribing medications of a kind or quantity sufficient to relieve
pain. Such challenges were suggested by the concurring opinions in Glucksberg and Quill,' based on the grounds that patients have a federal constitutional right to adequate pain medication and that laws that deter access to such medications
abridge that right.
Vulnerable laws would include those that discourage physicians from prescribing controlled substances. It is well documented
that laws requiring that prescriptions for controlled substances
be written in triplicate and laws strictly limiting the number of
60. Speculative parades of horribles are often employed by those opposing
reform. For example, in United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996),
Virginia argued that "admission of women would downgrade [Virginia Military Institute's] ... adversarial system and, with it, even the school." Id. at
2280. Justice Ginsberg, writing for a majority in holding that Virginia's categorical denial of women's admission into VMI violated the Equal Protection
Clause, recognized that Virginia's argument was "ajudgment hardly proved, a
prediction hardly different from other 'self-fulfilling prophec[ies]' once routinely used to deny rights or opportunities." Id. at 2280 (citation omitted).
61. The Quill and Glucksberg cases discussed supra Part I have been
widely credited with focusing efforts to improve the care of the dying. See,
e.g., INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE REPORT, supra note 22, at 206 ("Deficiencies in
care of the dying were recognized well before the recent assisted suicide ... court challenges. Nonetheless, much of the recent attention to deficiencies in end-of-life care arose only when the issue of assisted suicide came
before the Supreme Court.").
62. See supra note 21. A thoughtful critique of the bioethics community's
failure to condemn this is presented in Ben A. Rich, A Legacy of Silence: Bioethics and the Culture of Pain,18 J. MED. & HuMAN. 233 (1997).
63. See supra notes 15-23 and accompanying text.
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dosage units per prescription, for example, have the effect of deterring physicians from prescribing controlled substances.'
Cases challenging such laws could be brought on federal
constitutional grounds, asserting that, to the extent the laws
serve to deter physicians from prescribing controlled substances
in kind and quantity sufficient to relieve the pain of a dying patient, they abridge the constitutional rights of such patients.
V. DISCIPLINARY ACTION AND MEDICAL MALUPRACTICE
LITIGATION: HOLDING PHYSICIANS RESPONSIBLE
FOR FAILING TO ADEQUATELY TREAT
THE PAIN OF DYING PATIENTS
An area ripe for examination by those committed to
prompting improvements in the care of the dying is the possibility of motivating physicians to take more seriously the pain
management of their dying patients by subjecting physicians
who fail to do so to disciplinary proceedings or malpractice actions. As noted above, a disturbing number of dying patients
suffer unrelieved pain in the terminal phase of their illness.
This percentage is much larger than it should be because with
utilization of pain management techniques, including the provision of sufficient medication, pain can be alleviated in all but a
small fraction of cases. 5
Currently, physicians fear that prescribing controlled substances will invite regulatory oversight, and, in fact, medical
disciplinary boards are active in policing prescribing practices."
This is one reason for the endemic problem of insufficient provision of strong pain relievers.67 However, physicians who fail to
adequately treat and medicate suffering patients do not currently perceive that their actions may be subject to review by
medical disciplinary boards. Moreover, inadequate pain treatment can potentially expose a physician to civil negligence liability, although this risk too is underappreciated. This imbalance
between perceived and potential risk must be corrected.

64. See supra note 22 (listing studies documenting this effect).
65. See supra note 15.
66. See, e.g., Arthur Allen, FirstDo No Harm, WASH. POST, July 27, 1997,
Magazine, at 10 (detailing case involving disciplinary action taken against Dr.
William Hurwitz for perceived excessive prescribing of controlled substances
to patients with chronic intractable pain); Jacob Sullum, No Relief in Sight,
REASON, Jan. 1997, at 22 (discussing disciplinary action against Dr. Hurwitz).
67. See supra notes 22, 62, 64 and accompanying text.
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One effective way to prompt physicians to improve pain
management for dying patients is to hold accountable those who
fail to do so adequately. Medical disciplinary boards will likely
soon play an important role in this process.68 Boards should begin pursuing cases of inadequate pain management as zealously
as they do cases of perceived excessive prescription. Outside efforts to speed disciplinary boards in this direction can be anticipated.
Medical malpractice actions provide a second vehicle for
prompting improved pain management for the dying. A growing
number of states have passed statutes designed to encourage
physicians to prescribe controlled substances in kind and quantity sufficient to relieve patients' pain.69 In some states, medical
regulatory boards have also promulgated pain management
guidelines.7 In states with this kind of legislation or regulatory
guidance, it should be possible to prevail on a medical negligence
claim, because these provisions will assist in establishing the
standard of care to which the provider should be held.7
CONCLUSION
The U.S. Supreme Court, in the first cases to present the
question, declined to answer the narrow question posed by physicians and dying patients asserting a. constitutional right to
choose a humane and dignified death with physician assistance
in the form of provision of medications the patient could selfadminiter. All of the Justices expressed the hope that the issue
would be resolved through the political process, on a state-by68. The recent landmark report issued by the Institute of Medicine concluded that it would be appropriate for medical boards to discipline physicians
who fail to apply proven methods of pain control. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE
REPORT, supra note 22, at 197.
69. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2241.5 (West Supp. 1998); FLA.
STAT. ch. 458.326 (West Supp. 1998); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630.3066
(Michie 1996); N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.3-02 (1997).
70. See Sulum, supra note 66, at 10 (discussing reform of medical board
guidelines in states of Texas and California).
71. See Shapiro, supra note 22, at 362 (finding that [slome state statutes
expressly accommodate the admissibility of practice guidelines as evidence of
the standard of care," citing Vermont and Maine, in particular). Even without
the aid of such provisions, success may be obtainable. For example, in a 1991
North Carolina case involving inadequate treatment for pain against a nurse
and a long-term care facility, ajury awarded the deceased patient's estate and
the patients survivors $15 million, half of which was for punitive damages.
The case was later settled for an unreported amount while it was on appeal.
See Estate of Henry James v. Hillhaven Corp., Super Ct. Div. 89CVS 64
(Hertford Cty., N.C. Nov. 20, 1990), cited in Shapiro, supra note 22, at 361.
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state basis.' The Court's invitation to state legislatures to take
on this issue should now be used by advocates of expanding patient choice as they urge legislators and voters to take responsibility for this matter.
A majority of the Court expressed the view that federal constitutional protection for choosing physician assistance in dying
might be recognized in a future case.' A case presenting the
plight of competent, terminally ill patients whose pain cannot be
relieved even with state-of-the-art pain-management techniques
is most likely to succeed.
Similarly, litigation designed to make the option of a humane, physician-assisted death available to competent dying
patients may be brought to state high courts under state constitutional provisions protecting individual liberty, privacy, or dignity. These state provisions are often more textually explicit regarding the protection of individual liberty than are those of the
Federal Constitution. State high courts are obligated to independently examine a claim to state constitutional protection and
are not, and must not be, bound to interpret the state constitution in the same manner that the federal high court has interpreted a counterpart provision in the Federal Constitution.
Several Supreme Court Justices revealed their view that
patients have, in effect, a constitutional right to receive adequate
pain medication. 4 Laws that serve to obstruct access to such
medication should not survive judicial scrutiny. Cases challenging such laws based on a claim of federal constitutional protection of a right to adequate pain medication can be anticipated.
Medical providers who care for the terminally ill and fail to
provide pain medication in type and quantity sufficient to relieve
pain, in cases where this is possible, are at risk for professional
discipline and medical malpractice actions. At the same time,
fear that prescribing strong pain medication to relieve the pain
of terminally ill patients will invite disciplinary action must be
eradicated. Efforts to correct the imbalance of perceived and actual risk in this area can be anticipated.

72. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
73. See supra notes 12-27 and accompanying text.
74. See supra notes 15-23 and accompanying text.

